Waiting for a new storm? Dmitri Trenin’s article in the “Storm in the Caucasus”

The 44-day Karabakh war, which broke out in the fall of 2020, was a turning point not only for its participants, Armenia and Azerbaijan. It changed the political and military balance of forces in the South Caucasus, contributed to the further rise of Turkey as a regional power, outlined the real limits of Russia's influence in the Transcaucasia and the degree of real interest of the US and EU countries in this part of the post-Soviet territory.

Azerbaijan's achievement of air supremacy through drones and cruise missiles was not only one of the main factors determining the outcome of the war but also the ability to develop military art in armed conflicts of this scale.

Considering how quickly and powerfully the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict resumed after 26 years of freezing, the current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be considered stable. And if it is so, then we should not only learn lessons from the last war but also follow the dynamics left by it.

First, it should be assumed that the results of the armed conflict, shocking the defeated side and causing them deep wounds, did not fully satisfy the winners either. There are no opportunities for Armenian revenge in the foreseeable future, and Azerbaijan will strive to restore its complete and final control over the entire territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The current status quo in the region is unstable. Russia's previous bet on maintaining a long-term balance between its ally Armenia and its partner Azerbaijan in the zone of maintaining its role as an arbiter, which monitors the situation in the conflict zone, is not realistic. The Moscow-brokered 1994 ceasefire lasted more than a quarter of a century but ultimately did not prevent a new war. It makes no sense to rebuild something like this on the ruins of Nagorno-Karabakh.